Russia Energy Ban Myth Buster - Revision history

Admin at 07:36, 17 June 2022

2022-06-17T07:36:09Z

Alexk at 10:23, 7 June 2022

2022-06-07T10:23:39Z

HolgerB at 06:18, 7 June 2022

2022-06-07T06:18:27Z

Alexk at 23:52, 6 June 2022

2022-06-06T23:52:25Z

Alexk at 23:28, 6 June 2022

2022-06-06T23:28:10Z

Alexk at 23:04, 6 June 2022

2022-06-06T23:04:24Z

Alexk at 14:32, 6 June 2022

2022-06-06T14:32:59Z

Alexk: /* MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway) */

2022-06-06T14:28:06Z

MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway)

Alexk: /* MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway). */

2022-06-06T14:23:40Z

MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway).

Alexk at 14:13, 6 June 2022

2022-06-06T14:13:42Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:36, 17 June 2022
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	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> The world has fundamentally changed, there is no going back and the status quo is no longer feasible. See [https://twitter.com/BachmannRudi/status/1502833929224691718 here]. That is why it is imperative that the [https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/graduated-sanctions-schedule-for-russian-oil-and-gas-by-lukasz-rachel-and-moritz-schularick-2022-03 adjustment starts immediately]. We urgently need action that spurs efforts to adjust consumption of Russian energy, instead of lobbying politicians in Berlin and other capitals to delay the inevitable.		<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> The world has fundamentally changed, there is no going back and the status quo is no longer feasible. See [https://twitter.com/BachmannRudi/status/1502833929224691718 here]. That is why it is imperative that the [https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/graduated-sanctions-schedule-for-russian-oil-and-gas-by-lukasz-rachel-and-moritz-schularick-2022-03 adjustment starts immediately]. We urgently need action that spurs efforts to adjust consumption of Russian energy, instead of lobbying politicians in Berlin and other capitals to delay the inevitable.
−
−	~~[[de::Embargo_Mythbuster]]~~

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:23, 7 June 2022
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	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">NOT NECESSARILY:</span> the marvel of market economy is its adaptability. [https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/01/29/how-will-europe-cope-if-russia-cuts-off-its-gas New sources of supply] will come on stream and demand will adjust. Production processes will change over time. Only [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/15/opinion/germany-russia-ukraine-gas.html a small degree] of substitutability makes a world of difference. There are plenty of real-world examples of how production adjusts, often in extreme circumstances, see [https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/RussianGas_Substitution.pdf here], [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290.2019.1693411 here], [https://cen.acs.org/content/cen/articles/96/i9/New-Toyota-magnet-cuts-rare.html here], [https://www.japanfs.org/sp/en/news/archives/news_id031067.html here] and [https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/13/22975246/ford-ship-sell-incomplete-vehicles-missing-chips here] (did you know that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gianduja_%28chocolate%29 Nutella] was invented as a result of Napoleon blocking cocoa supplies?). Some firms may face short-term interruptions, others may not adjust and will be replaced by new, more flexible firms. This change is costly for the incumbents, so it is not very surprising that it is resisted. See [https://twitter.com/BachmannRudi/status/1502833924527075331 here] for more.		<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">NOT NECESSARILY:</span> the marvel of market economy is its adaptability. [https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/01/29/how-will-europe-cope-if-russia-cuts-off-its-gas New sources of supply] will come on stream and demand will adjust. Production processes will change over time. Only [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/15/opinion/germany-russia-ukraine-gas.html a small degree] of substitutability makes a world of difference. There are plenty of real-world examples of how production adjusts, often in extreme circumstances, see [https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/RussianGas_Substitution.pdf here], [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290.2019.1693411 here], [https://cen.acs.org/content/cen/articles/96/i9/New-Toyota-magnet-cuts-rare.html here], [https://www.japanfs.org/sp/en/news/archives/news_id031067.html here] and [https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/13/22975246/ford-ship-sell-incomplete-vehicles-missing-chips here] (did you know that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gianduja_%28chocolate%29 Nutella] was invented as a result of Napoleon blocking cocoa supplies?). Some firms may face short-term interruptions, others may not adjust and will be replaced by new, more flexible firms. This change is costly for the incumbents, so it is not very surprising that it is resisted. See [https://twitter.com/BachmannRudi/status/1502833924527075331 here] for more.
		+
		+	= MYTH #7: Even if the estimates of the fallout suggest it is manageable, these estimates are uncertain. Why would you take such a risk? =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">BECAUSE</span> not acting now comes with [https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2022-03/importstopp-gas-russland-ukraine-energie/seite-2 even greater risks]. Is it prudent to be at the mercy of Putin next winter? And is it wise to refrain from doing everything we can to avoid the disaster of war
		+	spilling to ever more countries, closer and closer to home? We must act ASAP to manage these truly enormous risks. More [https://twitter.com/klaus_adam/status/1503687074431614986 here].
		+
		+	= MYTH #8: Such a ban would be unsustainable in the long-term. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> The pain is short-term. The economic adjustment means that the embargo’s cost will decline over time. Ultimately, this policy will speed up our transition towards a greener, cleaner, and
		+	more sustainable economy.
		+
		+	= MYTH #9: People of Europe would never support a costly action. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> In fact, they do. Despite the campaign of fear, about 70% of Germans support the ban. See [https://twitter.com/Armin_Falk/status/1506614466770841605 here], [https://twitter.com/kniggem/status/1502798251220770818 here], [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel/status/1502030958597345302 here], and [https://twitter.com/Wahlen_DE/status/1500394045507575811 here].
		+
		+	= MYTH #10: Come winter, popular opinion would have shifted and we must make a U-turn. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">UNLIKELY:</span> An energy ban policy could be the best way to end this war quickly. See [https://twitter.com/sguriev/status/1503029218900381698 here]. A version of this argument is that yellow vests would take to the streets. First, there is no sign of that
		+	whatsoever. Second, if we allow the fear of potential (nowhere to be seen) yellow vests to blind our moral compass, wouldn’t we be at a loss.
		+
		+	= MYTH #11: Any one country – and in particular Germany - cannot do this by themselves, so there’s no point thinking about it. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">UNTRUE:</span> Germany is Europe’s largest economy and most dependent on Russian energy. It is clearly pivotal in these discussions. It must assume the leadership position that it deserves. How can
		+	we expect smaller and poorer countries to undertake costly action in the future, e.g. on climate change, if we do not see such leadership now? See [https://twitter.com/klaus_adam/status/1503687074431614986 here] for a discussion
		+
		+	= MYTH #12: We need to keep an ace up our sleeve against Putin - we need leverage. And we need a diplomatic solution. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">UNLIKELY:</span> This surely is the point of [https://www.ft.com/content/a35b041a-448b-42bf-b38d-431729b60e43 maximum impact]. Putin has brought mass murder and destruction on an industrial scale to Ukraine because Ukrainian people chose to be part of free Europe. Our “leverage” so far has achieved nothing to stop this, perhaps partly because tools that are never used are not leverage. Penalize the atrocities now. Down the road, the West can
		+	exert leverage through rewarding good behavior by [https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/16/blinken-withdrawal-necessary-russian-sanctions-00017671 lifting sanctions], if it so wishes. Weakening Putin financially will strengthen Ukraine’s bargaining position. To increase pressure on Putin, Europe could commit to a [https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/graduated-sanctions-schedule-for-russian-oil-and-gas-by-lukasz-rachel-and-moritz-schularick-2022-03 pre-announced schedule of sanctions].
		+
		+	= MYTH #13: Advocates of the ban are too “excited” and “hot-headed”. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> The advocates are the only ones who have produced clear and transparent analysis of the issue, using state-of-the-art methods. To have world expert analysis available without delay
		+	should be [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel/status/1506824191798042626 any policymakers’ dream]. Others, e.g. some politicians, corporate lobby and commercial bank economists produced nothing beyond gut feelings and comments that amount to
		+	scaremongering. But yes, of course, the matter is extremely urgent. Everyday lives and dreams are destroyed. Act now.
		+
		+	= MYTH #14: We’ve made a historic U-turn on military spending, and that is already a costly policy. Perhaps that is sufficient? =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">NO:</span> This U-turn does nothing to stop the massacre now. And much more military spending will be needed in the new cold (or hot) war scenario if Putin wins in Ukraine.
		+
		+	= MYTH #15: It is unfortunate that some countries happen to be heavily dependent on Russia. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> The dependence on Russian energy is not an accident – it is a direct consequence of the wrong-headed policies that have been pursued. How to share the responsibility for these errors is
		+	ultimately a political choice, but there is no doubt that people of Ukraine are paying the highest price. Europe’s addiction to Russian energy is a double edged sword – one that we can hit Putin
		+	hard with if we dare to.
		+
		+	= MYTH #16: If we wait it out, we can go back to the status quo as of mid-Feb 2022. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> The world has fundamentally changed, there is no going back and the status quo is no longer feasible. See [https://twitter.com/BachmannRudi/status/1502833929224691718 here]. That is why it is imperative that the [https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/graduated-sanctions-schedule-for-russian-oil-and-gas-by-lukasz-rachel-and-moritz-schularick-2022-03 adjustment starts immediately]. We urgently need action that spurs efforts to adjust consumption of Russian energy, instead of lobbying politicians in Berlin and other capitals to delay the inevitable.

	[[de::Embargo_Mythbuster]]		[[de::Embargo_Mythbuster]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:18, 7 June 2022
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	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">NOT NECESSARILY:</span> the marvel of market economy is its adaptability. [https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/01/29/how-will-europe-cope-if-russia-cuts-off-its-gas New sources of supply] will come on stream and demand will adjust. Production processes will change over time. Only [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/15/opinion/germany-russia-ukraine-gas.html a small degree] of substitutability makes a world of difference. There are plenty of real-world examples of how production adjusts, often in extreme circumstances, see [https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/RussianGas_Substitution.pdf here], [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290.2019.1693411 here], [https://cen.acs.org/content/cen/articles/96/i9/New-Toyota-magnet-cuts-rare.html here], [https://www.japanfs.org/sp/en/news/archives/news_id031067.html here] and [https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/13/22975246/ford-ship-sell-incomplete-vehicles-missing-chips here] (did you know that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gianduja_%28chocolate%29 Nutella] was invented as a result of Napoleon blocking cocoa supplies?). Some firms may face short-term interruptions, others may not adjust and will be replaced by new, more flexible firms. This change is costly for the incumbents, so it is not very surprising that it is resisted. See [https://twitter.com/BachmannRudi/status/1502833924527075331 here] for more.		<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">NOT NECESSARILY:</span> the marvel of market economy is its adaptability. [https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/01/29/how-will-europe-cope-if-russia-cuts-off-its-gas New sources of supply] will come on stream and demand will adjust. Production processes will change over time. Only [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/15/opinion/germany-russia-ukraine-gas.html a small degree] of substitutability makes a world of difference. There are plenty of real-world examples of how production adjusts, often in extreme circumstances, see [https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/RussianGas_Substitution.pdf here], [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290.2019.1693411 here], [https://cen.acs.org/content/cen/articles/96/i9/New-Toyota-magnet-cuts-rare.html here], [https://www.japanfs.org/sp/en/news/archives/news_id031067.html here] and [https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/13/22975246/ford-ship-sell-incomplete-vehicles-missing-chips here] (did you know that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gianduja_%28chocolate%29 Nutella] was invented as a result of Napoleon blocking cocoa supplies?). Some firms may face short-term interruptions, others may not adjust and will be replaced by new, more flexible firms. This change is costly for the incumbents, so it is not very surprising that it is resisted. See [https://twitter.com/BachmannRudi/status/1502833924527075331 here] for more.
		+
		+	[[de::Embargo_Mythbuster]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:52, 6 June 2022
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	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> secondary sanctions may be employed ([https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf Iran] provides a recent [https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/23/these-6-charts-show-how-sanctions-are-crushing-irans-economy.html example]). We are already seeing private businesses staying away from Russia in fear of breaching sanctions (e.g. see [https://www.cbsnews.com/news/shell-russia-ukraine-stop-buying-oil-natural-gas/#:~:text=Energy%20giant%20Shell%20said%20Tuesday,over%20the%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine here])		<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> secondary sanctions may be employed ([https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf Iran] provides a recent [https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/23/these-6-charts-show-how-sanctions-are-crushing-irans-economy.html example]). We are already seeing private businesses staying away from Russia in fear of breaching sanctions (e.g. see [https://www.cbsnews.com/news/shell-russia-ukraine-stop-buying-oil-natural-gas/#:~:text=Energy%20giant%20Shell%20said%20Tuesday,over%20the%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine here])
		+
		+	= MYTH #4: A ban would cause “mass poverty” in Europe / would have “incalculable” or “unimaginable” impact. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> Available estimates suggest the impact could be between 0.5-3.5% of GDP, or 200 to 1200 euros per head in Germany, the country most dependent on Russian energy. It would be less
		+	elsewhere. These are significant costs, but they are a far cry from anything that justifies the kind [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel/status/1502737615640006661 fear-invoking] [https://www.ft.com/content/3d63d1de-2af8-41ba-b579-54b9e2643eb3 language]. [https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkpbs/ECONtribute_PB_028_2022.pdf State-of-the-art macroeconomic analysis] which includes (a) worst case
		+	scenarios; (b) impact of cascading effects through supply chains; (c) impact on inflation; (d) parameter uncertainty; (e) [https://twitter.com/makro_philip/status/1505932219109548033 demand effects] estimates the hit to German GDP between 0.5-3% (middle
		+	of this range much more likely than the top). [https://benjaminmoll.com/GS_Russian_Gas/ Goldman Sachs] assume little adjustment takes place and estimate a loss of 3.5%. The [https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.projections202203_ecbstaff~44f998dfd7.en.pdf ECB] calculates a 1.4% hit to euro area GDP in the most severe
		+	scenario of energy ban. Bruegel describe how Europe can do without [https://www.bruegel.org/2022/03/can-europe-manage-if-russian-oil-and-coal-are-cut-off/ oil and coal] and without [https://www.bruegel.org/2022/02/preparing-for-the-first-winter-without-russian-gas/ gas] from Russia. For a longer-term perspective on what a hit to GDP of this magnitude means (it is significantly less severe than Covid, for example), see [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel/status/1503399875676815360 here].
		+
		+	= MYTH #5: The less well-off would be hurt the most, b/c of unemployment and higher inflation. Particular regions and industries would collapse. =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">INCOMPLETE:</span> the consequences are indeed likely to be uneven, both across the income distribution and also (primarily) across sectors and regions. For example, steel and chemical industries
		+	are likely to be significantly affected. Critically, our governments have the appropriate policy tools to deal with these impacts, and given the manageable aggregate impact, they can afford to do
		+	so. We know how to cushion the impact on unemployment and incomes of individuals – we have done this before ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurzarbeit Kurzarbeit]), not least during Covid (which was a much bigger shock, and when
		+	unemployment rate didn’t budge, see [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel/status/1503399895998234627 here]). We could also directly protect the businesses that are most affected for example through funding any short-term production stoppages. Some
		+	assert that manufacturing is more difficult to assist than services, but this is not true. With a 2% hit to GDP, a deficit-financed support designed to prevent any second-round effects would raise
		+	debt-GDP by roughly 2 percentage points (from 71 to 73% in the case of Germany). Time to use this cushion is surely now. A detailed discussion of the distributional issues is [https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkpbs/ECONtribute_PB_028_2022.pdf here].
		+
		+	= MYTH #6: Business leaders and industry experts say it’s impossible to adjust. Don’t they know best? =
		+
		+	<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">NOT NECESSARILY:</span> the marvel of market economy is its adaptability. [https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/01/29/how-will-europe-cope-if-russia-cuts-off-its-gas New sources of supply] will come on stream and demand will adjust. Production processes will change over time. Only [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/15/opinion/germany-russia-ukraine-gas.html a small degree] of substitutability makes a world of difference. There are plenty of real-world examples of how production adjusts, often in extreme circumstances, see [https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/RussianGas_Substitution.pdf here], [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290.2019.1693411 here], [https://cen.acs.org/content/cen/articles/96/i9/New-Toyota-magnet-cuts-rare.html here], [https://www.japanfs.org/sp/en/news/archives/news_id031067.html here] and [https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/13/22975246/ford-ship-sell-incomplete-vehicles-missing-chips here] (did you know that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gianduja_%28chocolate%29 Nutella] was invented as a result of Napoleon blocking cocoa supplies?). Some firms may face short-term interruptions, others may not adjust and will be replaced by new, more flexible firms. This change is costly for the incumbents, so it is not very surprising that it is resisted. See [https://twitter.com/BachmannRudi/status/1502833924527075331 here] for more.

@@ Line 12: / Line 12: @@
 = MYTH #2: Russia can sell oil & gas to China and elsewhere, so we’d only be hurting ourselves. =
-<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> : a complete substitution towards China is infeasible given the scale of European imports: [https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51618 we buy 49% of Russian oil and 74% of Russian gas]. And if China becomes nearly the sole buyer, it
+<span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> a complete substitution towards China is infeasible given the scale of European imports: [https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51618 we buy 49% of Russian oil and 74% of Russian gas]. And if China becomes nearly the sole buyer, it will bargain hard, limiting the revenue flows. Ultimately, if Putin did not need our money, he would have turned off the tap already.
-will bargain hard, limiting the revenue flows. Ultimately, if Putin did not need our money, he would have turned off the tap alrea

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 Original version: https://t.co/L26ZGfX9IK
-= MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway) =
+= MYTH #1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway) =
 <span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> there’s no doubt that a ban would drastically limit the real resources available for war. Existing sanctions are inherently leaky. They limit the availability of the stock of Russia’s reserves,
@@ Line 10: / Line 10: @@
 [https://twitter.com/t0nyyates/status/1501625549013368840 here] and [https://twitter.com/FabioGhironi/status/1501614475547340802 here]. See also [https://dropbox.com/s/wmptre3vkfkqysf/Guriev%20Itskhoki.pdf top Russian economists] – the most informed voices on these issues on the planet -- forcefully argue that the energy ban is our best chance to stop the war early ([https://spiegel.de/wirtschaft/oel-und-gas-aus-russland-warum-ein-embargo-wladimir-putins-krieg-beenden-koennte-a-9537c522-5f56-4856-97bc-86080c2b7028 in German here]).
-= MYTH 2: Russia can sell oil & gas to China and elsewhere, so we’d only be hurting ourselves. =
+= MYTH #2: Russia can sell oil & gas to China and elsewhere, so we’d only be hurting ourselves. =
 <span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">FALSE:</span> : a complete substitution towards China is infeasible given the scale of European imports: [https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51618 we buy 49% of Russian oil and 74% of Russian gas]. And if China becomes nearly the sole buyer, it
 will bargain hard, limiting the revenue flows. Ultimately, if Putin did not need our money, he would have turned off the tap alrea

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 Frequent arguments against taking action now, and why they don’t stack up -- by [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel @lukaszrachel]
 = MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway) =
@@ Line 7: / Line 9: @@
 resources obtained through energy exports, the empty rubles would fuel (hyper)inflation and an economic collapse. Currently, [https://finance.yahoo.com/news/russian-central-bank-allows-exporters-081913016.html forex revenues] are sold to support the ruble ([https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/RUB%3DX/chart?p=RUB%3DX which has appreciated most recently]), limiting the impact domestically. So yes, there is no escaping it: our energy purchases are directly funding Putin’s war machine. See numbers [https://beyond-coal.eu/russian-fossil-fuel-tracker/ here] and more analysis
 [https://twitter.com/t0nyyates/status/1501625549013368840 here] and [https://twitter.com/FabioGhironi/status/1501614475547340802 here]. See also [https://dropbox.com/s/wmptre3vkfkqysf/Guriev%20Itskhoki.pdf top Russian economists] – the most informed voices on these issues on the planet -- forcefully argue that the energy ban is our best chance to stop the war early ([https://spiegel.de/wirtschaft/oel-und-gas-aus-russland-warum-ein-embargo-wladimir-putins-krieg-beenden-koennte-a-9537c522-5f56-4856-97bc-86080c2b7028 in German here]).

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 Frequent arguments against taking action now, and why they don’t stack up -- by [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel @lukaszrachel]
-= MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway).=
+= MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway) =
 FALSE: there’s no doubt that a ban would drastically limit the real resources available for war. Existing sanctions are inherently leaky. They limit the availability of the stock of Russia’s reserves,
-but the flow of energy revenues on the order of 700 million euros per day is more than enough to hire mercenaries, buy weapons and destabilize EU politics. Over 40% of Putin’s budget
+but the flow of energy revenues on the order of 700 million euros per day is more than enough to hire mercenaries, buy weapons and destabilize EU politics. Over [https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/19/daniel-yergin-on-russia-losing-its-status-as-an-energy-superpower 40%] of Putin’s budget revenues derive from energy exports - without this income, enormous cuts to public spending across the board will be required. Printing rubles does not help: without the backing of the real
-revenues derive from energy exports - without this income, enormous cuts to public spending across the board will be required. Printing rubles does not help: without the backing of the real
+resources obtained through energy exports, the empty rubles would fuel (hyper)inflation and an economic collapse. Currently, [https://finance.yahoo.com/news/russian-central-bank-allows-exporters-081913016.html forex revenues] are sold to support the ruble ([https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/RUB%3DX/chart?p=RUB%3DX which has appreciated most recently]), limiting the impact domestically. So yes, there is no escaping it: our energy purchases are directly funding Putin’s war machine. See numbers [https://beyond-coal.eu/russian-fossil-fuel-tracker/ here] and more analysis
-resources obtained through energy exports, the empty rubles would fuel (hyper)inflation and an economic collapse. Currently, forex revenues are sold to support the ruble (which has
+[https://twitter.com/t0nyyates/status/1501625549013368840 here] and [https://twitter.com/FabioGhironi/status/1501614475547340802 here]. See also [https://dropbox.com/s/wmptre3vkfkqysf/Guriev%20Itskhoki.pdf top Russian economists] – the most informed voices on these issues on the planet -- forcefully argue that the energy ban is our best chance to stop the war early ([https://spiegel.de/wirtschaft/oel-und-gas-aus-russland-warum-ein-embargo-wladimir-putins-krieg-beenden-koennte-a-9537c522-5f56-4856-97bc-86080c2b7028 in German here]).

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−	~~RUSSIA ENERGY BAN MYTH BUSTER~~ by [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel @lukaszrachel]	+	Frequent arguments against taking action now, and why they don’t stack up -- by [https://twitter.com/LukaszRachel @lukaszrachel]
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−	~~Frequent arguments against taking action now, and why they don’t stack up~~

	= MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway).=		= MYTH 1: We are not financing Putin’s war (b/c of sanctions, he cannot use the billions of euros/dollars we send him anyway).=