Feasibility

TL;DR: Russian energy embargo is feasible both technically and economically, and popular counter-arguments do not stack up

Economical studies

Numerous studies by different research institutes and think tanks show that immediate embargo of Russian gas, oil and coal would be manageable. The costs are estimated comparable or below Coronavirus protection measures (e.g, -0.5% to -6% GDP in Germany). A moderate recession of -2 % to -3 % in 2023 would be followed by a quick recovery in 2024. Importantly, many earlier studies analyzed the impact of an embargo starting from March/April 2022. Banning Russian energy now (July) would be even easier/cheaper: EU gas storage filling levels increased from 25% in March to >60% as of mid-July . Cynically, this "improvement" was paid by thousands of Ukrainian lives.

Author	Publication date	Embargo start	Scope	Energy type	Title	Estimated impact
ENTSOG	October 2022		Europe	Natural gas	Winter Supply Outlook 2022/23	Demand reduction of ca. -15% efficiently mitigate the risk demand curtailment in EU countries during winter season. Europe would be exposed to 4% - 13% demand curtailment only during a peak day under Russian supply disruption
ECONtribute	05.08.2022	August 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Wie es zu schaffen ist	Required consumption reduction (Aug 2022 - Apr 2023): -25% on average (Electricity: -45%, Households: -16%, Industry: -26%) GDP: similar to March 2022 study (-0.5% to -3%)
Bundesnetzagentur	03.08.2022	21.07.2022	Germany	Natural gas	Gas-Szenarien von Juli 22 bis Juni 23	No gas shortage in scenarios without Nord Stream 1, but with proportional export reductions and 20% savings (since 07/2022) and 16 GW of LNG (since 01/2023). As of 21.08.2022, storage level is at least 5% higher than predicted in the most optimistic scenario.
Fraunhofer IEG & SCAI TU Berlin	July 2022	2022	Europe	Natural gas	European gas supply security given interrupted supply from Russia	European demand can be covered w/o russian gas, and required adjustments of the distribution network are technically feasible. Requirements: European collaboration and -20% consumption vs. 2021
IMF	19.07.2022	July 2022	Germany	Natural gas	The Economic Impacts on Germany of a Potential Russian Gas Shutoff	GDP (vs. baseline): -1.5 % in 2022, -2.7 % in 2023, and -0.4 % in 2024 Inflation: +2 % in 2022 and 2023
IMF	19.07.2022	July 2022	Europe	Natural gas	Natural Gas in Europe: The Potential Impact of Disruptions to Supply	Up to 70 % could be replaced from alternative sources, no shortages for around 6 months. Longer term: from below 1% up to 6% GDP depending on the country
Bruegel	07.07.2022	July 2022	Europe	Natural gas	European Union demand reduction needs to cope with Russian gas cuts	Without Russian gas, the European Union would have to reduce demand by approximately 15%, with big differences between different parts of Europe
Gemeinschaftsdiagnose	28.06.2022	July 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Zur Gefahr einer Gaslücke in Deutschland bei einem Wegfall russischer Lieferungen – Sonderauswertung Juni 2022	The gas gap does no longer exist, nonetheless price increases should be propagated to consumers soon.
vbw	28.06.2022	July 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Konsequenzen eines Importstopps von russischem Erdgas	NOTE: this study is based on unrealistic assumptions and therefore can not be taken seriously, see Our analysis (12.7% reduction of economic output by cross value-chain propagation of effects are claimed)
Bundesnetzagentur	21.06.2022	July 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Gas-Mengengerüst von 06/22 bis 06/23	No gas shortage in scenarios without Nord Stream 1, but with proportional export reductions and/or 20% savings (since 07/2022) and 16 GW of LNG (since 01/2023). Small to moderate shortage (19-107 TWh) in other scenarios. There seems to be an underestimation of the savings impact in scenario 2.2.1, which should be higher if we assume the graphically about 20 GWh/h savings on slide 6.
Deutsche Bundesbank	20.06.2022	July 2022	Germany	All	Perspektiven der deutschen Wirtschaft für die Jahre 2022 bis 2024	GDP 2023: -3.2 % (vs. 2022) or -6.75% (vs. baseline scenario) Note: alternative scenario simulates multiple risks from war escalation: energy embargo, supply chain problems etc.
IWH Halle update	20.06.2022	July 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Deutsche Gasspeicher erreichen jahreszeitüblichen Füllstand.	Gas reserves are sufficiently filled so that immediate embargo is manageable. Some shortage expected in case of very cold winter. "Seit [der Vorgängerstudie im April] hat sich die Situation jedoch deutlich verändert. Die Füllstände der deutschen Gasspeicher entsprechen mittlerweile dem für die Jahreszeit üblichen Niveau von etwa 50%, und sie dürften noch weiter steigen. Sollte es im Laufe der kommenden Monate zu einem Lieferstopp für russisches Gas kommen, könnte der Gasbedarf im Winter 2022/2023 wohl vollständig bedient werden zumal höhere Gaspreise die Nachfrage dämpfen wüden. Bei einem sehr harten Winter mit entsprechend hohem Gasverbrauch in den privaten Haushalten könnte es allerdings immer noch zu einem Engpass kommen."
IMK (Krebs)	9.05.2022	May 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Auswirkungen eines Erdgasembargos auf die Gesamtwirtschaftliche Produktion In Deutschland	Basic scenario: GDP -3.2 % to -8.0 % (Mai 2022 - Apr 2023) Optimistic scenario: GDP -1.2 % to -3.0 % (Mai 2022 - Apr 2023)
IWH Halle	26.04.2022	July 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Regional effects of recession in Germany due to Russion gas supply interruption	The results are nuanced and often (arbitrarily?) misinterpreted by gas embargo opponents. Hence, we discuss them in detail here.
DIW Berlin ifo München IfW Kiel IWH Halle RWI Essen	12.04.2022	July 2022	Germany	All	From pandemic to the energy crisis – Economy and politics under permanent stress	GDP: +1.9% in 2022, -2.2% in 2023 Unemployment: 5.2% in 2022, 6.0% in 2023 in gas embargo scenario, as opposed to non-embargo scenario, which assumes 5.0% for both years (p. 67)
DIW	08.04.2022	April 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Energy supply in Germany is secured also without natural gas from Russia	~10% gas shortage
Agora Energiewende	March/April 2022	April 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Energy security and climate protection reconciled: The way out of the fossil energy crisis	Short-term saving potential between 160 TWh and 260 TWh, which is close to the amount of Russian gas to be replaced (230--290 TWh)
IMK	March 2022	April 2022	Germany	Natural gas	Ukraine war complicates post-pandemic recovery: Economic forecast 2022/2023	GDP 2022: -3.9% (vs. 2021) to -6% (vs. baseline scenario) (the cost of reducing gas demand by ~15% of imported volumes through higher prices)
Leopoldina	08.03.2022	April 2022	Germany	Natural gas	How Russian gas can be substituted in German and European energy supply	"We come to the conclusion that immediate stop of Russian gas supply would be manageable for German economy. It could come to shortages in the next winter, however it is possible to limit negative effects and alleviate social hardness by implementing the suggested counter-measures."
ECONtribute	07.03.2022	April 2022	Germany	All	What if...? The economic impact of a Russian energy import ban on Germany	GDP: -0,5 % to -3 %
Goldman Sachs	07.03.2022	April 2022	Europe	Natural gas	The Impact of Gas Shortages on the European Economy (Schnittker)	GDP (2022 relative to baseline): EU -2.2 %, Germany -3.4 %, Italy -2.6 %
Allianz Research	03.03.2022	April 2022	Europe	Natural gas	Can Europe do without Russian gas?	+40% electricity price increase and a +100% gas price, which would reduce demand by 8-10% and increase supply from alternative sources by 8-10% in the short-term
Aurora Research	03.03.2022	April 2022	Europe	Natural gas	Impact of Russia-Ukraine war on European gas markets: can Europe cope without Russian gas?	-14% demand reduction with concerted efforts by regulators, industry and consumers EUR 60-100 billion investment and government intervention to fill the storage Video presentation
Bruegel	28.02.2022	March 2022	Europe	Natural gas	Preparing for the first winter without Russian gas	If all Russian gas imports were to stop on March 1, 2022: "Europe would need to reduce demand by at minimum 400 TWh (or 10%-15% of annual demand). This is possible. A portfolio of exceptional options could abate at least 800 TWh."

Opinions and statements

Pro-embargo

• Prof. Veronika Grimm, Wirtschaftsweise: „Es gibt kein Modell, das eine Katastrophe plausibel darlegt“
• Prof. Reint Gropp, Präsident des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle: "Gleichzeitig ist unstrittig, dass die Ukraine nicht nur sich selbst, sondern das gesamte westliche Wertesystem und unser Modell einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaftsordnung verteidigt. Da scheinen ein paar Prozent weniger Wachstum, gerade auch wenn der Staat bei den niedrigen Einkommen unterstützend eingreift, zu verschmerzen zu sein. Einige Beobachter, insbesondere aus der Industrie, haben aber argumentiert, dass speziell ein Gasembargo [...] im Winter zu frierenden Menschen und dem Abschalten ganzer Industriezweige führen würde. Ich denke, dass man diese Aussagen als von Eigeninteresse getriebene Schreckgespenste abtun kann. Denn es bleibt dabei unklar, warum eine Kombination von Wiederhochfahren der Kohle- und wohl auch Atomkraftwerke in Verbindung mit einem forcierten Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien sowie Energieeinsparungen (die sich durch die höheren Preise von selbst einstellen würden) und Flüssiggasimporten das Problem nicht lösen sollten. Es bleiben natürlich Risiken, aber ich denke, unsere Freiheit sollte es uns wert sein, jetzt konsequent zu handeln"

Alternatives to embargo

• Suggestion to offer to Russia buy a certain amount of gas at a fixed price and only if that fails do embargo Ockenfels, A., Zachmann, G. (2022), Gasmangel: Wie Deutschland das Gasspiel Putins drehen kann, retrieved 27 June 2022
• Suggestions on taxes on energy imports Sturm, J. (2022), The simple economics of a tariff on Russian energy imports, retrieved 16 June 2022

Contra-embargo

See Contra_embargo

Gas Delivery Reports

See: Energy data