Difference between revisions of "Feasibility"

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| GDP 2022: -3.9% (vs. 2021) to -6% (vs. baseline scenario) <br> (the cost of reducing gas demand by ~15% of imported volumes through higher prices)
 
| GDP 2022: -3.9% (vs. 2021) to -6% (vs. baseline scenario) <br> (the cost of reducing gas demand by ~15% of imported volumes through higher prices)
 
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Revision as of 16:59, 9 June 2022

TL;DR: Russian energy embargo is feasible both technically and economically, and popular counter-arguments do not stack up

Economical studies

Numerous studies by different research institutes and think tanks show that immediate embargo of Russian gas, oil and coal would be manageable. The costs are estimated comparable or below Coronavirus protection measures (e.g, -0.5% to -6% GDP in Germany). Importantly, most studies analyzed the impact of an embargo starting from March/April 2022. Banning Russian energy now (May/June) would be even easier/cheaper: EU gas storage filling levels increased from 25% in March to 50% as of June, 5th [1]. Cynically, this "improvement" was paid by thousands of Ukrainian lives.

Author Date Scope Energy type Title Estimated impact
IWH Halle [2] 26.04.2022 Germany Natural gas Regional effects of recession in Germany due to Russion gas supply interruption The results are nuanced and often (arbitrarily?) misinterpreted by gas embargo opponents.
Hence, we discuss them in detail here.
DIW Berlin
ifo München
IfW Kiel
IWH Halle
RWI Essen [3]
12.04.2022 Germany All From pandemic to the energy crisis – Economy and politics under permanent stress GDP: +1.9% in 2022, -2.2% in 2023
Unemployment: 5.2% in 2022, 6.0% in 2023 in gas embargo scenario, as opposed to non-embargo scenario, which assumes 5.0% for both years (p. 67)
DIW [4] 08.04.2022 Germany Natural gas Energy supply in Germany is secured also without natural gas from Russia ~10% gas shortage
Agora Energiewende [5] March/April 2022 Germany Natural gas Energy security and climate protection reconciled: The way out of the fossil energy crisis Short-term saving potential between 160 TWh and 260 TWh, which is close to the amount of Russian gas to be replaced (230--290 TWh)
IMK [6] March 2022 Germany Natural gas Ukraine war complicates post-pandemic recovery: Economic forecast 2022/2023 GDP 2022: -3.9% (vs. 2021) to -6% (vs. baseline scenario)
(the cost of reducing gas demand by ~15% of imported volumes through higher prices)
Leopoldina [7] 08.03.2022 Germany Natural gas How Russian gas can be substituted in German and European energy supply "We come to the conclusion that immediate stop of Russian gas supply would be manageable for German economy. It could come to shortages in the next winter, however it is possible to limit negative effects and alleviate social hardness by implementing the suggested counter-measures."
ECONtribute [8] 07.03.2022 Germany All What if...? The economic impact of a Russian energy import ban on Germany -0,5 % to -3 % GDP
Allianz Research [9] 03.03.2022 Europe Natural gas Can Europe do without Russian gas? +40% electricity price increase and a +100% gas price, which would reduce demand by 8-10% and increase supply from alternative sources by 8-10% in the short-term
Aurora Research [10] 03.03.2022 Europe Natural gas Impact of Russia-Ukraine war on European gas markets: can Europe cope without Russian gas? -14% demand reduction with concerted efforts by regulators, industry and consumers
EUR 60-100 billion investment and government intervention to fill the storage
Video presentation
Bruegel [11] 28.02.2022 Europe Natural gas Preparing for the first winter without Russian gas If all Russian gas imports were to stop on March 1, 2022: "Europe would need to reduce demand by at minimum 400 TWh (or 10%-15% of annual demand). This is possible. A portfolio of exceptional options could abate at least 800 TWh."


Opinions and statements

It is important to differentiate between evidence- and data-based studies listed above, and individual opinions, which are based on general wisdom and/or (presumed) expertise in the field, and can be heavily biased.

Pro-embargo

Prof. Veronika Grimm, Wirtschaftsweise: „Es gibt kein Modell, das eine Katastrophe plausibel darlegt“ [12]

Contra-embargo

Gas Delivery Reports

cost accounts:

For comparison: US cost of war in Afghanistan: $2.313 trillion, Watson Institute. “Human and Budgetary Costs to Date of the US War in Afghanistan, 2001-2022 | Characters | cost of war." The Costs of War, 2022. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022

References