Difference between revisions of "Feasibility"

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'''TL;DR: Russian energy embargo is feasible both technically and economically, and popular counter-arguments [[Embargo_mythbuster|do not stack up]]'''
 
'''TL;DR: Russian energy embargo is feasible both technically and economically, and popular counter-arguments [[Embargo_mythbuster|do not stack up]]'''
  
[[Energy data]]
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= Economical studies =
 
= Economical studies =
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= Gas Delivery Reports =
 
= Gas Delivery Reports =
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[[Energy data]]
 
* ddobble.net. “EU Member State Spending on Russian Fossil Fuels.”  http://beyond-coal.eu/russian-fossil-fuel-tracker/
 
* ddobble.net. “EU Member State Spending on Russian Fossil Fuels.”  http://beyond-coal.eu/russian-fossil-fuel-tracker/
 
* "EU Continues to Buy Russian Gas Amid Ukraine War - Bloomberg." Accessed March 29, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-04/eu-s-payments-for-russian-gas-surge-amid-war-chart
 
* "EU Continues to Buy Russian Gas Amid Ukraine War - Bloomberg." Accessed March 29, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-04/eu-s-payments-for-russian-gas-surge-amid-war-chart

Revision as of 19:51, 4 July 2022

TL;DR: Russian energy embargo is feasible both technically and economically, and popular counter-arguments do not stack up


Economical studies

Numerous studies by different research institutes and think tanks show that immediate embargo of Russian gas, oil and coal would be manageable. The costs are estimated comparable or below Coronavirus protection measures (e.g, -0.5% to -6% GDP in Germany). A moderate recession of -2 % to -3 % in 2023 would be followed by a quick recovery in 2024. Importantly, most studies analyzed the impact of an embargo starting from March/April 2022. Banning Russian energy now (May/June) would be even easier/cheaper: EU gas storage filling levels increased from 25% in March to 50% as of June, 5th [1]. Cynically, this "improvement" was paid by thousands of Ukrainian lives.

Author Date Scope Energy type Title Estimated impact
Gemeinschaftsdiagnose[2] 28.06.2022 Germany Natural gas Zur Gefahr einer Gaslücke in Deutschland bei einem Wegfall russischer Lieferungen – Sonderauswertung Juni 2022 The gas gap does no longer exist, nonetheless price increases should be propagated to consumers soon.
vbw[3] 28.06.2022 Germany Natural gas Konsequenzen eines Importstopps von russischem Erdgas 12+% reduction of economic output by cross value-chain propagation of effects are claimed. Our analysis
Bundesnetzagentur[4] 21.06.2022 Germany Natural gas Gas-Mengengerüst von 06/22 bis 06/23 Lack of gas in almost all scenarios, even if assuming 20% savings and 16 GW of LNG.
Deutsche Bundesbank[5] 20.06.2022 Germany All Perspektiven der deutschen Wirtschaft für die Jahre 2022 bis 2024 GDP 2023: -3.2 % (vs. 2022) or -6.75% (vs. baseline scenario)
Note: alternative scenario simulates multiple risks from war escalation: energy embargo, supply chain problems etc.
IWH Halle update [6] 20.06.2022 Germany Natural gas Deutsche Gasspeicher erreichen jahreszeitüblichen Füllstand. Gas reserves are sufficiently filled so that immediate embargo is manageable. Some shortage expected in case of very cold winter. "Seit [der Vorgängerstudie im April] hat sich die Situation jedoch deutlich verändert. Die Füllstände der deutschen Gasspeicher entsprechen mittlerweile dem für die Jahreszeit üblichen Niveau von etwa 50%, und sie dürften noch weiter steigen. Sollte es im Laufe der kommenden Monate zu einem Lieferstopp für russisches Gas kommen, könnte der Gasbedarf im Winter 2022/2023 wohl vollständig bedient werden zumal höhere Gaspreise die Nachfrage dämpfen wüden. Bei einem sehr harten Winter mit entsprechend hohem Gasverbrauch in den privaten Haushalten könnte es allerdings immer noch zu einem Engpass kommen."
IWH Halle [7] 26.04.2022 Germany Natural gas Regional effects of recession in Germany due to Russion gas supply interruption The results are nuanced and often (arbitrarily?) misinterpreted by gas embargo opponents.
Hence, we discuss them in detail here.
DIW Berlin
ifo München
IfW Kiel
IWH Halle
RWI Essen [8]
12.04.2022 Germany All From pandemic to the energy crisis – Economy and politics under permanent stress GDP: +1.9% in 2022, -2.2% in 2023
Unemployment: 5.2% in 2022, 6.0% in 2023 in gas embargo scenario, as opposed to non-embargo scenario, which assumes 5.0% for both years (p. 67)
DIW [9] 08.04.2022 Germany Natural gas Energy supply in Germany is secured also without natural gas from Russia ~10% gas shortage
Agora Energiewende [10] March/April 2022 Germany Natural gas Energy security and climate protection reconciled: The way out of the fossil energy crisis Short-term saving potential between 160 TWh and 260 TWh, which is close to the amount of Russian gas to be replaced (230--290 TWh)
IMK [11] March 2022 Germany Natural gas Ukraine war complicates post-pandemic recovery: Economic forecast 2022/2023 GDP 2022: -3.9% (vs. 2021) to -6% (vs. baseline scenario)
(the cost of reducing gas demand by ~15% of imported volumes through higher prices)
Leopoldina [12] 08.03.2022 Germany Natural gas How Russian gas can be substituted in German and European energy supply "We come to the conclusion that immediate stop of Russian gas supply would be manageable for German economy. It could come to shortages in the next winter, however it is possible to limit negative effects and alleviate social hardness by implementing the suggested counter-measures."
ECONtribute [13] 07.03.2022 Germany All What if...? The economic impact of a Russian energy import ban on Germany GDP: -0,5 % to -3 %
Goldman Sachs [14] 07.03.2022 Europe Natural gas The Impact of Gas Shortages on the European Economy (Schnittker) GDP (2022 relative to baseline): EU -2.2 %, Germany -3.4 %, Italy -2.6 %
Allianz Research [15] 03.03.2022 Europe Natural gas Can Europe do without Russian gas? +40% electricity price increase and a +100% gas price, which would reduce demand by 8-10% and increase supply from alternative sources by 8-10% in the short-term
Aurora Research [16] 03.03.2022 Europe Natural gas Impact of Russia-Ukraine war on European gas markets: can Europe cope without Russian gas? -14% demand reduction with concerted efforts by regulators, industry and consumers
EUR 60-100 billion investment and government intervention to fill the storage
Video presentation
Bruegel [17] 28.02.2022 Europe Natural gas Preparing for the first winter without Russian gas If all Russian gas imports were to stop on March 1, 2022: "Europe would need to reduce demand by at minimum 400 TWh (or 10%-15% of annual demand). This is possible. A portfolio of exceptional options could abate at least 800 TWh."

Opinions and statements

It is important to differentiate between evidence- and data-based studies listed above, and individual opinions, which are based on general wisdom and/or (presumed) expertise in the field, and can be heavily biased.

Pro-embargo

  • Prof. Veronika Grimm, Wirtschaftsweise: „Es gibt kein Modell, das eine Katastrophe plausibel darlegt“ [18]
  • Prof. Reint Gropp, Präsident des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle: "Gleichzeitig ist unstrittig, dass die Ukraine nicht nur sich selbst, sondern das gesamte westliche Wertesystem und unser Modell einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaftsordnung verteidigt. Da scheinen ein paar Prozent weniger Wachstum, gerade auch wenn der Staat bei den niedrigen Einkommen unterstützend eingreift, zu verschmerzen zu sein. Einige Beobachter, insbesondere aus der Industrie, haben aber argumentiert, dass speziell ein Gasembargo [...] im Winter zu frierenden Menschen und dem Abschalten ganzer Industriezweige führen würde. Ich denke, dass man diese Aussagen als von Eigeninteresse getriebene Schreckgespenste abtun kann. Denn es bleibt dabei unklar, warum eine Kombination von Wiederhochfahren der Kohle- und wohl auch Atomkraftwerke in Verbindung mit einem forcierten Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien sowie Energieeinsparungen (die sich durch die höheren Preise von selbst einstellen würden) und Flüssiggasimporten das Problem nicht lösen sollten. Es bleiben natürlich Risiken, aber ich denke, unsere Freiheit sollte es uns wert sein, jetzt konsequent zu handeln"[19]

Contra-embargo

  • Suggestion to offer to Russia buy a certain amount of gas at a fixed price and only if that fails do embargo Ockenfels, A., Zachmann, G. (2022), Gasmangel: Wie Deutschland das Gasspiel Putins drehen kann, retrieved 27 June 2022
  • Suggestions on taxes on energy imports Sturm, J. (2022), The simple economics of a tariff on Russian energy imports, retrieved 16 June 2022

Gas Delivery Reports

Energy data

cost accounts:

For comparison: US cost of war in Afghanistan: $2.313 trillion, Watson Institute. “Human and Budgetary Costs to Date of the US War in Afghanistan, 2001-2022 | Characters | cost of war." The Costs of War, 2022. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022

References

  1. https://agsi.gie.eu/
  2. Gemeinschaftsdiagnose (2022), Zur Gefahr einer Gaslücke in Deutschland bei einem Wegfall russischer Lieferungen – Sonderauswertung Juni 2022 (PDF)
  3. vbw (2022), Konsequenzen eines Importstopps von russischem Erdgas, retrieved 28 June 2022
  4. Bundesnetzagentur (2022), Gas-Mengengerüst von 06/22 bis 06/23, retrieved 28 June 2022
  5. https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/892560/ce8d8f455734b70d7c4d5f3fdc548c42/mL/2022-06-prognose-data.pdf
  6. https://www.iwh-halle.de/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/wirtschaft_im_wandel/wiwa_2022-02.pdf#page=4
  7. https://www.iwh-halle.de/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/iwh_policy_notes/iwh-pn_2022-01_de_Gaslieferstopp.pdf
  8. https://gemeinschaftsdiagnose.de/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/GD_F22_Langfassung_online.pdf
  9. https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.838841.de/diw_aktuell_83.pdf
  10. https://www.agora-energiewende.de/veroeffentlichungen/energiesicherheit-und-klimaschutz-vereinen/
  11. https://www.imk-boeckler.de/fpdf/HBS-008284/p_imk_report_174_2022.pdf
  12. https://www.leopoldina.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publikationen/Nationale_Empfehlungen/2022_Stellungnahme_Energiesicherheit_V1.1.pdf
  13. https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkpbs/ECONtribute_PB_029_2022.pdf
  14. https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GS_Russian_Gas.pdf
  15. https://www.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/azcom/Allianz_com/economic-research/publications/specials/en/2022/march/2022_03_03_EU_without_russian_gas.pdf
  16. https://nkro22cl16pbxzrpzy39bezk-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Aurora_Mar22_ImpactRussia_Ukraine_EuropeanGas_InsightsPage-1.pdf
  17. https://www.bruegel.org/2022/02/preparing-for-the-first-winter-without-russian-gas/
  18. https://www.capital.de/wirtschaft-politik/wirtschaftsweise-grimm-fuer-gas-emabargo-gegen-russland-31805540.html
  19. https://www.iwh-halle.de/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/wirtschaft_im_wandel/wiwa_2022-02.pdf